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Abstract. The advent of the digital era brings with it the dream of ‘transcending the 
human’ through the most sophisticated AI / robot technologies. The Author argues that 
the concept and practices of ‘transcendence’ are deeply ambiguous, since on the one 
hand they simply aim to overcome the weaknesses, limits and fragility of the human, 
while on the other hand they modify the human by selecting its specific qualities and its 
causal properties in a way to generate beings ‘other than human.’ Post / trans-humanist 
ideologies supporting a radical transformative change, instead of strengthening the 
human, lead to its dehumanization because they imply the denial of the characteristics 
that are uniquely human and / or those that constitute human nature. To understand 
when new digital technologies enhance the human (keeping it within its natural bound-
aries) or distort it, it is necessary to analyze and evaluate social processes on the basis 
of a relational vision that shows us which human relationships emerge from the use 
of technologies.
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1. The issue: “transcending the human”
Since prehistoric times, humans have lived in an ontological condition of 
profound ambivalence: on the one hand they experience their own limita-
tions, and, on the other, since they do not accept this condition, they want 
to go beyond their own nature. They feel they are made for the infinite, but 
every day they have to struggle in order not to fall back into the limits of the 
finite. They are the most unhappy beings, because, being weak and fragile, 
they dream of living without limits. The advent of the digital age seems to 
provide a new horizon of opportunities to take a decisive step towards the 
possibility of “transcending the human.”
What does it mean to “transcend” the human? Certainly it does not 
simply mean the possibility of using instrumental artifacts that can exempt 
people from certain tasks and functions, giving them more freedom (ac-
cording to Gehlen’s 1974 Entlastung theory). It does not mean that people 
can have new machines available to help them in doing their work. It means 
much more. It means going “beyond the human.” 
The quest to transcend the human by what I call “digital technological 
matrix” (Donati 2020) does not represent the creation of a “more human” 
being, but modifies the human by selecting its specific qualities and its causal 
properties in a way to generate “more than human” beings, which means 
“other than human.” From the cultural point of view, I define the digital 
technological matrix as the globalised symbolic code from which digital 
artefacts are created in order to help or substitute human agency by mediating 
interhuman relations or by making them superfluous. From the structural 
and practical point of view, the digital matrix is the complex of all digital 
technologies based on scientific knowledge and AI engineering (Donati 2021).
To put it bluntly, I argue that the idea of transcending the human through 
the digital technological matrix as envisaged by posthuman, transhumanist 
and cyborg ideologies that support a radical transformative change, leads 
to an increasing dehumanization.
Although the concept of dehumanization lacks a systematic theoretical 
basis, I maintain that, in general, it refers to meanings that involve the 
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denial of the characteristics that are uniquely human and / or those that 
constitute human nature. Most of what we call post-human theories and 
praxis entail cognitive underpinnings of animalistic and / or mechanistic 
kinds that do not represent forms of human transcendence, but instead of 
dehumanization. In the face of the trans-human era, we need new criteria 
in order to evaluate what humanizes the human and what de-humanizes it. 
In my view, the human person does not transcend herself in her single 
action1 because, even if augmented by new technologies, in her single 
action the person simply remains herself. The person transcends herself, 
that is, she goes beyond herself, when she comes out of herself, that is, she 
transcends herself in the inter-human social relationship.
From my point of view, the transcendence of the human consists in 
a relational capacity and not in the capacity of an individual entity like 
a robot (Donati 2020). For this reason, I cannot share the perspective of 
those scholars who argue that we find ourselves in front of a person (not 
necessarily endowed with a human body) if the mind of such an entity (for 
example a robot) is capable of activating individual reflexivity in action. 
This thesis is supported for example by Archer (2019a), who admits the 
possibility of creating robots endowed with the first-person perspective. 
She believes that robots can be friends of the human beings and, as such, 
should be attributed human and citizenship rights. To me, the arguments 
put forward by Baker (2002) and Archer (2019b) reflect a severely deficient 
anthropology in understanding what it means to be able to transcend the 
human. 
From my point of view, it is in the interpersonal relation, with it and 
through it, that we can understand what is infungibly human, both in the 
single person and in social forms. The human, as a reality in actu, lies in the 
intersubjective relation because the latter has qualities and causal properties 
that are not replaceable by any other entity, be it artificial or belonging to the 
natural physical world. When someone speaks of the virtues of the fidelity of 
dogs or the humility of chimpanzees, and more generally of certain animals 
1 By ‘single action’ I mean the Parsonian ‘unit act’ (see Parsons 1937).
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as ethically superior to the human being, this is to talk about qualities and 
causal properties that reside in one’s mind, not in reality, because human 
virtues are characterized by moral qualities that non-human animals cannot 
in any way have. The same holds true for smart robots, androids or other 
human-like machines. When a child talks about the robot as his ‘best friend,’ 
he is talking about a relational experience that does not have the qualities 
and causal properties of an inter-human friendship relationship, but it is 
only a series of exchanges that can be useful and satisfying for him.
2. Rethinking human evolution
In my view, we have to face two grand scenarios of human evolution, under-
lying the present cultural dynamics in the globalized world, that implicitly 
contain two prevailing models of understanding human transcendence. 
On one side, a (Western) scenario based upon the expansion of science 
combined with technology, positivistically geared to generating new being 
with superhuman abilities. On the other side, the (Eastern) idea that world 
evolution consists in a continuous bringing into existence of what does not 
exist, i.e., a process in which human transcendence means the construction of 
a machine of Nothing. As Jones (2013, p. 418) reminds us, Western traditions 
(with exceptions such as Spinoza) view the world as an array of individual 
objects that are bound in a web of causal ties, whereas Eastern traditions 
view it as a unity in which the appearances of plurality and diversity are no 
more than ripples on the surface of an oceanic continuum. Applying this 
Eastern worldview (called ‘Buddha-nature’) to the human-machine interac-
tion, depending on how you look at it, I could be regarded as managing the 
automobile, or it could be regarded as managing me. To control, in effect, 
is to be controlled. Thus, human beings and machines are fused together 
in an interlocking entity.
(a) The first scenario can be exemplified by those contributions to 
the volume The Onlife Manifesto; Being Human in a Hyperconnected Era, 
edited by Luciano Floridi (2015), which assume that human nature is 
equal to a bios equipped with psychism and that in the future the human 
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will consist of these dimensions enhanced by technology. The distinctions 
between human beings and other living beings (animals and plants) will be 
gradually reduced. Human sociability will be transformed accordingly. In 
this perspective, the human being is considered as nature’s beautiful glitch, 
i.e., a beautiful error of natural evolution that has succeeded in surviving 
and now is evolving into an info-sphere which becomes anthropo-eccentric 
rather than anthropocentric. The basic tenet is that ‘more tech makes us 
more human’. Such a prospect runs the risk of losing a critical view of the 
different forms of enhancement, that is, of losing the distinction between 
those technologies that allow the human person to maintain her identity 
and those that produce deterioration, such as to break or violate that identity 
making the human person a slave of the same technologies.
It seems to me that opposing Floridi’s view on the basis of a wholly 
individualistic first-person perspective is not enough, because the latter 
does not recognize the consistency, needs and uniqueness of the relation 
between mind and body in each person. If one follows Lynne Rudder Baker 
(2007, p. 205), one could think that the first-person perspective is perfectly 
compatible with the positivistic scenario depicted by The Onlife Manifesto, 
once we agree with Baker that technology can change the human body 
without affecting the person’s identity, since the person can still think of 
herself as herself. 
If parts of my human body were replaced by synthetic parts until the body that 
constitutes me was no longer a human animal, then, as long as my first-person 
perspective remained intact, I would continue to exist and I would continue to 
be a person. But if nothing had my first-person perspective, then there would 
be no me. (Baker 2002, p. 371)
My account of the first-person perspective has some naturalistic and some 
non-naturalistic aspects. It is naturalistic in that it does not appeal to imma-
terial souls. The first-person perspective may well have evolved by means of 
natural selection; we human persons, with our first-person perspectives, are 
as much a part of the natural world as were dinosaurs. I have no doubt that 
there’s something going on in my brain that makes it possible for me to have 
I* thoughts [in Baker’s language, the asterisk means thoughts of myself on 
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myself] and I have no doubt that our capacity to have I* thoughts is a product 
of natural selection. (Baker 2007, p. 206)
I agree with Baker that there cannot be an adequate ontology—an inventory 
of what really exists — that includes no first-person subjects of experience. 
But to agree on this perspective does not mean accepting the total splitting 
of body and mind in a person, because it would mean underestimating the 
influence of social relationships in the constitution of personal identity. 
It would mean a return to the Cartesian ‘cogito, ergo sum’. That is, I exist 
only because I think, whereas my body is held to be a ‘res extensa’(extended 
thing) possessing the substance of wax. According to this argument, one 
could never similarly demonstrate the existence of the ‘other’. Because of 
this, humans can know the self and its thoughts, but cannot actually know 
anything of anything that is not the self.
Human body, mind, and agency cannot be completely separated. Ei-
ther they have some integration, or the human is no longer such and the 
action is no longer human. The unity of this difference is given by the 
energy (energeia) proper to their relationship. Splitting body and mind is 
an abstract operation that can serve to justify a individualistic first-person 
perspective, defined as “our inwardness—our abilities not just to think, but 
to think about our thoughts; to see ourselves and each other as subjects; 
to have rich inner lives.” Baker 2002, p. 370). This is a naïve perspective. It 
does not see how the relationships between people influence their inner 
life, and does not provide any meaningful account of the real experiences 
of ‘normal’ people (not humanoids or robots) in connecting their body and 
mind in a hyper-technological society. The ‘inner’ abilities Baker is referring 
to are strictly dependent on the new communicative environment as well 
as the possibility of keeping a sense of identity in the connections between 
body and mind. Baker’s first-person perspective seems to be a strategy that 
proposes to leave the body to technologies and preserve (indeed enrich) 
the ‘reflective mind,’ as if the same technologies did not have a powerful 
influence on personhood through body modifications. In the end, what she 
calls the “constitution view” of the human person is a-relational, (Baker 2016) 
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in a double way: because she splits what is human and what is person, and 
because she ignores the role of social relations in constituting the way in 
which the first-person perspective can actually operate.
On the Constitution View, something is a person in virtue of having a first-person 
perspective (or a narrowly defined capacity for one), and something is a human 
person in virtue of being a person constituted by a human animal (or body). 
Human persons are material beings, part of the natural order. As I develop the 
idea of constitution, this view of human persons has the consequence that 
although I am both a person and an animal, I am most fundamentally a person. 
Hence, my persistence conditions are the persistence conditions of a person 
(sameness of first-person perspective), not the persistence conditions of an 
animal (sameness of biological organism). (Baker 2002, p. 370)
(b) The second scenario can be illustrated by quoting an evocative paper 
by Bilimoria (2012), in which he comments on the Vedic texts, where it is 
written: “In the beginning, there was neither Non-Being (asat) nor Being 
(sat)” (RgVeda X.129.1; it is called ‘hymn to the creation’). Bilimoria asks: 
“what was there, bottomless deep?.” Eventually he responds positively. 
The argument is that “Radical Nothingness ought not to be feared: it may 
have therapeutic value in the hallowed Wittgenstenian-Yogacārin sense (an 
antidote for excessive linguistic conceptualism); it may prove to be a timely 
yet fairest watchdog on the excesses of Technoscience culture (to which 
Heidegger similarly drew attention), as well as on fundamentalisms of all 
varieties the return of religion to the public sphere (despite the Enlight-
enment’s decree), secularism re-seeking the sacred enchantments, and on 
other attachments to Absolutes.” (Bilimoria, 2012: 528). Therefore – so he 
concludes, “let there always be non-being so we may see their subtlety, and 
let there always be being so we may see their outcome. The two are the same. 
But after they are produced, they have different names. They both may be 
called deep and profound… Deeper and more profound...” (quotation from 
Tao-te Ching by Lao-tzu). 
Ultimately, this scenario leads to see the evolution of the whole of 
creation, and of human evolution within it, as a ‘machine of Nothingness,’ 
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in the sense of bringing into existence what does not exist originally. In 
the end, Bilimoria describes his perspective as a “frustrated attempt to 
complete fabricating a machine that creates Nothingness, or work it up at 
least as the transcendental concept of which no smaller can be conceived” 
(Bilimoria 2012, p. 529).
In its naturalistic version it could be, for example, bringing into exis-
tence and socially institutionalizing a sexual role which is neither male nor 
female, as in the case of fa’afafine in Samoa culture. In Japanese, Chinese 
and Indian cultures it can mean to give real existence to certain fictional 
beings. In this scenario, there is no reason to distinguish between Human 
and Non-Human, or to think of transcending the human, simply because, to 
put it bluntly, the religious matrix of these cultures is a sort of naturalistic 
pantheism. Their transcendental matrix is the same Nature. I use the term 
‘transcendental matrix’ in the same sense that can be found in Weber’s 
analysis of the religious roots of world cultures (Weber 1993).
The general notion of ‘matrix’ here refers to a cultural code (symbols 
and norms for their use) that orients or steers the way in which agents/
actors intersect their intents, the situational context in which they find 
themselves, the meanings they use and the generated effects. 
… intent, context and effect are better considered as intersecting concepts that 
cannot be compartmentalized into discrete categories. It is not about privileging 
intent, context or effect, but recognizing their interdependency. In order to 
move away from the notion of discrete variables that have their own unique 
influences, we call this inter-relationship the intent-context-effect matrix. 
(McCormack et al 2016, p. 760)
While the term matrix is generally used in the sense of ‘matrix of society,’ 
here I would like to underline its transcendent, metaphysical dimensions 
compared to a constructionist view of society.
In short, I have chosen to mention these two visions because, although 
distant and even contradictory in some respects, they seem to merge in 
globalizing society. What emerges from their mix is a culture that views 
human transcendence as an endless evolution that is supposed to supersede 
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human deficiencies by mixing natural and artificial elements of all kinds. 
Western rationalism is mixed with Eastern naturalism within a complex 
‘nature + technology’ in which transcendence is a matter of immanence. 
The result is a vision of human transcendence as a process of continuous 
up-grading of life forms which resembles a process of incessant creation 
of new singularities (see the theory of technological singularity). From my 
point of view, however opposite, these two scenarios seem to be connected 
by a subtle and hidden thread, that of a kind of vitalism mixed with some 
kind of existential relativism. What is now called ‘post-truth politics’, is, in 
fact, a form of cultural post-rational and post-ethical agnosticism, since in 
the digital media ‘anything goes’, which means that communications do not 
discriminate between truth and non-truth, and rationality is substituted 
by emotionality.
The two scenarios just mentioned place human transcendence, re-
spectively, in the total immanence of technological evolution and in an 
immanent process of creation that makes exist what is not. It is noteworthy 
that this strategy was adopted by Niklas Luhmann (1995) to build his overtly 
anti-humanistic sociological theory (Donati 2011).
I would like to present here a third scenario that introduces another idea 
of human transcendence. It conceives transcendence as an emerging relation 
between what exists (immanent reality) and what can be (transcendental 
reality). What I call the ‘relational order’ is precisely the transcendental, 
generative mechanism linking immanent and transcendent realities.
Bhaskar’s basic argument, according to which the ‘true’ objects of social 
sciences are the real (although typically unobserved) generative mechanisms 
underlying phenomena (and not what can be observed and measured empir-
ically), is transcendental in nature, i.e. it implies a transcendental logic array 
(Bhaskar 1989). Later on he talked of a meta-reality. Those who deny this 
possibility end up by erasing the possibility of any sociological humanism. 
This is what Breslau (Latour’s follower) claims: “… human agency depends 
on the agency of things, and the objectivity of the social world depends 
on the objectivity of the natural world-as we know it, not an unknowable 
transcendent natural world.” (Breslau 2000, p. 305).
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I argue that at the beginning of any creation (not only of the original 
creation) there is not a bottomless depth, but a Being ever able to transcend 
itself by relating himself to Non-Being. It is in this process of transcendence 
(emergence) that being and non-being are related, while no one of them 
can exist per se in absolute isolation. The very nature of creation would 
then consist in a relation that brings into existence what does not exist 
through a process of emergence. Is it possible to think that what is human 
can transcend itself in this ‘relational nature’ of creation? The possibility 
of arguing in favour of a positive answer to this question lies in the social 
ontology of what we mean by ‘relation’ and ‘relationality.’
3. The distinction human/non-human as a transcendental 
relation, and its enigma
To speak of transcendence implies a social ontology of reality. In turn, 
such an ontology refers to a transcendental reality, and therefore it calls 
for the existence of a transcendental cultural matrix to which the ontology 
is closely connected. When I claim that this matrix is ‘theological’ I do not 
refer to the dogmatic beliefs of a specific religious faith. I mean the symbolic 
code underlying every great culture or civilization concerned with ultimate 
realities (Donati 2019a). 
It is a matter of fact that any science does refer to such a kind of cultural 
matrix, although very often in an unwitting or unspoken way. All sociologies 
have a symbolic matrix that depends on a ‘mother-matrix’ where ultimate 
realities are placed. According to Anders (2016, sections 22–26), the fact that 
not only our experiences, but even our needs, are molded, represents the 
maximum service of the matrix. This is because the matrices mold not just 
us, but the world itself. The artificial models of the ‘world’ not only mold us 
and our image of the world, but the real world itself. This molding process 
has a boomerang effect: that the lie really lies to itself. In short: the real is 
transformed into the copy of its images. Many scholars will probably disagree 
on this claim, but nevertheless they cannot deny that any scientific theory 
possesses a meta-theory through which it ‘sees’ the world. The founding 
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fathers of sociology, including Comte, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, provide 
different examples.
For clarity’s sake, let me make explicit what I mean by the term ‘tran-
scendence.’ To me, it means: (i) a meta-level of reality that we need to 
reach in order to get a deeper explanation of what happens in reality or to 
imagine a reality beyond what exists, by relating to a further ‘layer’ beyond 
what already exists in an open horizon (matrix) of up-grading orders of 
realities; (ii) the necessity of this relation, as distinct from its contingencies; 
(iii) whereas ‘necessity’ is a matter of recognition of what is latent (hidden, 
invisible, unmeasurable) as an ‘ultimate reality’ bordering on religion (i.e. 
what is sacred, and, as such, conferring a dignity to every being, in the sense 
of recognizing that every existing being deserves the respect that is due to it 
according to its own nature). The recognition of the dignity of every entity 
(in Latin the word dignus means ‘a thing or a person deserving respect for 
its qualities’) marks the boundary between what I call ‘immanent transcen-
dence’ (as a product of society) and ‘transcendent transcendence’ (as a reality 
which is not the product of society, because it is pre- and meta-social, it is 
a meta-reality).
The concept of human dignity can become significant only if one admits 
the existence of these two orders of reality (what transcends factual reality 
for emergence from empiricism, and transcendence that does not depend 
on facts because it is meta-empirical; Bhaskar 2012), and only if one is able 
to see and manage the intrinsic relationships of these two orders. In the 
absence of these conditions, proposals regarding a good society sound in 
vain or they are reduced to abstract moral and legal notions. This is the case, 
for instance, with three reports issued in October 2016 by the White House, 
the European Parliament, and the UK House of Commons outlining their 
visions concerning how to prepare society for the widespread use of AI. After 
assessing the merits of these reports, Cath et al. (2017) complain that they 
do not provide any foresight for describing the future that, as a society, we 
would like to see. Cath et al recommend a two-pronged approach in order 
to steer the process of developing the ‘good AI society.’ According to them, 
on the one hand, policies should ensure that AI is steered fully towards 
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promoting the public good; on the other hand, projects could fruitfully rely 
on the concept of human dignity as the lens through which to understand 
and design what a good AI society may look like. But these authors have to 
admit that both notions of ‘public good’ and ‘human dignity’ are latent real-
ities, irreducible to their immanent definitions in legal or otherwise terms. 
These realities belong to the relations between the domain of immanent 
transcendence and meta-realty, i.e. to the latency of society.
This latent reality should not be understood as a Deus ex machina. Such 
a mechanical God is not necessary for the final resolution of human enigmas 
as in Greek tragedy. The resolution lies in adopting a relational theological 
matrix that can make us understand the reasons why we need to resort to 
some kind of transcendence in order to explain the dynamics of social reality 
without mechanical or deterministic artifices. I define a symbolic code (or 
semantics) as a set of symbols and the rules to use them in looking at the 
world and interpreting phenomena, facts and events. When the symbols 
refer to ‘ultimate realities’ (ἔσχατος, éskhatos) and the rules follow a logic of 
first principles, a symbolic code takes on the form of a ‘theological matrix’. 
Why I call it so? Because, in this case, the symbolic code is a reflection of 
a theology (theos+logos), i.e. a discourse or inquiry on the divine truth. In 
short, the symbolic code derives from the way we ‘semantize’ God, where 
people find His presence in terms of those ultimate realities that explain 
what happens in the world.
The question we are faced with is: what are the relationships between 
the human and transcendental realities?
We are confronted with a crucial, terribly difficult issue, which is the 
following: whether or not, to support determinate human-social relations 
(‘horizontal relationships’, so to speak), a transcendental matrix is nec-
essary (that is, resorting to ‘vertical’ relations among the stratified layers 
of reality). If not, why? If yes, which characteristics should it have? More 
generally, the question is whether or not the social ontology of the relations 
of which we speak (like, for example, love, as an interpersonal relation and 
not as a subjective sentiment or passion) requires a metaphysics rooted in 
a theology understood not as a discipline in itself and for itself (based on 
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Revelation), but, in sociological terms, purely as a symbolic cultural matrix. 
In this paper I argue that the source of the meaning of the human- social 
relation lies in its transcendental matrix, although the social relation is 
generated (or is not generated) due to autonomous causes.
For example, everyone agrees that love is essential in the life of a couple 
or a family. But love must be qualified, it cannot be a relationship whatever: 
it must be love in a due order and with a ‘deep’ meaning. In such contexts, 
as an ultimate concern, love needs to be referred to a transcendent sym-
bolic matrix from which it takes its meaning in order to be pursued with 
appropriate practices. From a Simmelian point of view, which I share, social 
life has a transcendent character (“the transcendent character of life”) that 
permeates even the use of money, given the fact that, in Western culture, 
mundane monetary interactions and exchanges are related to key religious 
forms of experience, like faith, unity, and individuality (Silver and O’Neill 
2014).
In this contribution, I would like to say how relational sociology seeks to 
respond to these basic questions on which the possibility of linking human 
(social) relations and transcendental (supernatural) relations depends. 
This possibility, in its turn, depends on the fact of being able to see and 
manage the enigma of the relation, the enigma that lies in relationality as 
such (Donati 2019b).
In summary, the problem is the following: whether or not it is neces-
sary—if not, why, and if so, what is it—to resort to a symbolic matrix that 
allows us to face the enigma of the relation in such a way that it is possible 
to see how and why human relations and transcendental relations are at 
the same time ontologically connected to each other (not by similitude or 
metaphor) and distinct. This is possible to the extent that the said symbolic 
matrix assumes that the relational is a transcendental or genetic principle 
(Debaise 2012).
The inherent defect of traditional humanism, based upon naïve realism, is 
that of understanding social relations with others and with the world simply 
as a “manifestation” of the qualities inherent in the human person and her 
inner life. Of course, good actions are the energy to break out of ourselves and 
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be prepared to undertake generous tasks which will be of benefit to all. How-
ever, to undertake an action on the basis of internal impulses does not mean 
that a certain result actually follows. It poses the question: are human-social 
relations simply an expression of inner experiences, of self-consciousness, 
in one word of the internal conversations of persons? Or are social virtues 
simply inherent in human nature? In my view, in answering these questions 
(which are the enigmas that social reality, as an oracle, places before us), 
we must face unexpressed challenges whose solution lays the path that can 
lead to a possible neo-humanism open to transcendence.
As is well known, the classical (Aristotelian) conception affirms that 
virtue does not depend on consciousness (this corresponds rather to the 
modern, Cartesian or even Kantian, idea), but rather on good action, that 
is, in accordance with one’s own nature; according to this view, virtue 
ultimately depends on nature, and, since the nature of the human being 
is social, the virtuous life is also a life in service of the common good. To 
my mind, this is a naïve and insufficient view, because the social nature of 
the person is not enough to explain the common good as relational good 
(Donati 2019b). We need many intervening factors between what we call 
the nature of a human person and its social behavior. The factors become 
more and more complex as society becomes more and more ‘relational,’ i.e. 
oriented to free humans from natural limitations and constraints.
The idea that relations are a product of subjective consciousness (the 
first-person perspective) corresponds to what I call a naïve conception of the 
social as a human reality not mediated by what ‘is among’ human beings, 
according to which social relations and their effects are a sort of ‘prolonging’ 
or result of feelings (good or evil), of virtues (or vices), of an autonomous 
intimate life (or estrangement) of persons.
From the sociological standpoint, this derivation (induction) is prob-
lematic, if understood sic et simpliciter. Sobriety and the care of Creation, 
brotherhood, and other social virtues are now, in fact, in crisis precisely 
because it is no longer sufficient that the person wants them intentionally, 
whether it be a single person or a ‘moral person’, like a civil association or 
social movement.
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There is something that lies ‘in the middle’ between the actions of 
single individuals to which we must give new focus. The social virtues, 
in fact, differently from the individual ones, refer to social relations. We 
call them both human, but is there any difference between them? Social 
virtues do not arise in an immediate and spontaneous way from within 
people, because, between the interior life of the person and social reality, 
they emerge (and are increasingly multiplying) from mediations (made up 
of relations) that make the immediacy and spontaneity of social outcomes 
completely uncertain and improbable. 
In the new globalized environment, in order to create a certain social 
relation equipped with certain human qualities and causal properties 
(for example, in a couple, family, workplace, street, neighborhood, social 
networks, etc.), it is not only necessary to have a certain disposition and 
agency of individuals, but another condition becomes just as necessary: 
namely, that the persons ‘see’ the specific good (or evil) of that relation, 
and pursue that relation as good (or bad) in itself. 
In the absence of this condition, the individual act, even the most virtu-
ous and best intentioned, can create—albeit unintentionally—a relational 
evil instead of a relational good. Daily life is full of cases in which people 
who are in themselves good and close to each other create contentious and 
negative relationships. What went wrong? From a sociological viewpoint, 
what did not work was precisely the relation between them. While being 
good persons individually, they have neither seen nor cared for their 
relationship, which had decisive influences on themselves and the people 
around, whether or not they were aware of it.
The fact is that the social relation has its own reality, which is an 
‘emergent’ not automatically derived from the qualities and dispositions 
of the individuals in relation. This is nothing other than what relational 
sociology says. From this standpoint the social relation appears as an enigma. 
In order to cope with it, I argue, we need a transcendental symbolic matrix.
We are dealing with exploring a new horizon, that of a culture of 
inter-human relations that can allow people to creatively respond to the 
inevitable enigmas of living together not by having recourse to ‘more and 
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more tech’, but transcending the existing social context and human limits 
through a new relationality.
Conclusions: human beings transcend themselves  
in social relations, not technology
In this contribution, I have tried to confront the old humanism of the 
West, taking into account the deep changes of our times that are trying to 
transform the human into something else through technological progress. 
Basically, I see the possibilities of a neo-humanism in overcoming the old 
‘personalistic views’ that have put what is human inside the individual as 
such rather than in its inner relational constitution.
The first-person perspective advocated by Lynne Rudder Baker (Baker 
2015) claims that humans and non-humans have in common ‘personhood’ 
and differ by their bodies. She assumes that the unity between the material 
and the ideational elements of any entity has no constitutive relational iden-
tity. To me, this means assuming that the nature of the relationship between 
the human body and the human mind can be equated to the relationship 
between bronze material and a bronze statue. By this way we arrive at the 
result of considering smart robots as persons, precisely ‘electronic persons’, 
endowed with individual rights and duties. 
This is where we arrive if we see electronic agents, as well as non-human 
animals, as new players in the political and legal arenas, as Gunther Teubner 
does (2006). If a robot were regarded as a legal entity, it could be held liable 
for its actions. Robot ethicists often consider a robot a moral actor, but their 
arguments are deeply questionable. Amitai and Oren Etzioni (2017) have 
argued with valid reasons that AI and robots have no moral agency, and that 
the term ‘autonomous’, commonly applied to these machines, is misleading, 
and leads to invalid conclusions about the ways these machines can be kept 
ethical. This is where we find the enigma of the social relationships that 
these ‘persons’ could activate. 
Are the qualities and causal properties of the social relations acted by 
non-human ‘persons’ (as defined by Baker) equal to those proper to human 
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persons? Certainly not. The relation between organism and reflexivity in 
a human being has a level and kind of contingency and context-dependency 
that cannot have any functional equivalent in a machine, whatever its ability 
to act as a person (‘I think I am I’) in respect to the matter it is made of. 
Recognizing the dilemma inherent to the body-mind relationship exist-
ing in a human being as different from that of a machine means seeing the 
proper qualities and causal power of human persons in respect to any other 
entity. No artificial intelligence can manage the enigmas of human relations 
as human beings do, although the latter can respond to the enigmas in the 
most absurd, violent and deviant ways. I don’t think that machines might 
in principle be persons, because, although they can behave by reflecting 
in the first person, ontologically they lack the potential for expressing and 
managing proper relational feedbacks, relational generative mechanisms, 
and in particular ‘relational steering’ (Donati 2013). Possibly machines 
can be more predictable and controlled, but replacing human beings with 
machines would mean condemning human persons incapable of managing 
their enigmas to become servants of machines (Morozov, 2013). It would 
create a society where few people command and the masses were intended 
to be treated as scrap. 
Trying to resolve the enigma in a human way means being able to 
configure the qualities and properties of the relations in such a way that 
those involved can share something essential while their differences bloom. 
Obviously, this does not always occur even in human beings, because it 
requires an adequate personal and relational reflexivity. What is sure is the 
fact that it cannot ever happen for a machine.
If one tackles the issue of hybrid liability of intelligent systems, one has 
to recognize the existence of what Werner Rammert has called ‘distributed 
agency’ (Rammert 2008). In distributed agency human action is distributed 
between many loci and instances that plan, control, and execute the ac-
tivities. Agency is distributed between human beings. That is also the case 
in the hybrid liability constellation. Agency remains with natural persons. 
Robots work as mediators. Taken together, robot mediators have impact on 
the liability division between human beings.
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Posthumans and transhumans are dreams populated by phantoms, and 
very peculiar phantoms that appear to be real, or better, seem to be real 
because they produce some realities. As Günther Anders (2016: section 24) 
claimed many years ago: “Phantoms are not only matrices of the experience 
of the world, but the world itself. The real as reproduction of its reproduc-
tions.” The kind of evolution that they feed is not human. To avoid all the 
deceits that they bring with them, we need a neo-humanism that leaves 
behind the old humanism. 
Humanism is no longer synonymous with ‘personalism,’ since what is 
human and what is personhood are more and more differentiated (according 
to the relationist idea, put forward by Baker, that there can be persons who 
are not human). Still today traditional personalism distinguished humans 
from other living beings for their ability to exercise an inner reflexivity 
and make individual choices of communicated ultimate concerns, on the 
assumption that the goodness of these features would bring spontaneously 
the common good. Neo-humanism must acknowledge that this simple 
concept of the person is no longer sufficient to identify the human person. 
The latter should be redefined from a relational perspective. In the new 
scenario, a person is human, and becomes more human (that is transcends 
herself), if and to the extent that she generates social relationships that 
support the flourishing of relational goods from which she feeds herself in 
order to be more humane (Donati 2019c). 
Some may come to the misgiving that my perspective affirms two con-
trary things: that relation is already there and at the same time must come 
into being. How does one state that “in the beginning there is the relation” 
if relation must be realized? Does this affirmation not have the Platonic 
flavor of supposing that there is an ideal subsistent reality that must only 
be actuated? This is not so. What I am arguing is the fact that persons come 
into existence and live in a context (which is always there) from which they 
are put into a structural relation within which they must act relationally. 
They are thus found necessarily in a morphostatic/morphogenetic process 
in which and through which people can reproduce preexisting relations 
or create new types of relations that confer on them previous identities or 
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change them. These emergent identities may or may not meet (in various 
ways) the potentiality of the persons, and from here the greater or lesser 
happiness of the persons, according to the sense of greater or lesser human 
self-realization.
The transcendence of what is human cannot but happen with reference 
to this relational constitution. We have to look at the ontology of social 
relationality, which has to maintain the autonomy of the human beings and 
at the same time bring out their relational good, in which they transcend 
themselves together with their differences. Trust, cooperation, caring for 
other people, and friendship are examples par excellence. Future highly 
intelligent and sophisticated machines will help human beings to transcend 
themselves, but transcending the human can only be a relational reflexive 
activity of human persons.
When we do not know what to do with others and with the situations of 
life, or what relation to have with the contingent world around us, then we 
feel confused, weak, fragile, sad, and in crisis. Every existential situation in 
which we find ourselves, each encounter with something or someone that 
puts us in trouble, is a relation that challenges us. Usually, we do not think 
of these situations in terms of relations, because we only see individuals 
and things. We must confront something (a situation) or someone (people 
around) and ask ourselves what to do. The fastest way to go is to find 
a technological device that can solve this problem. In reality, however, 
behind the challenge of situations, there is a challenge that we do not see, 
and it is the most important challenge. It is the challenge of the relation 
in play, which asks us to transcend ourselves.
We need to see the Vital Relation that, by linking the unity of body 
and mind to the context of existence, makes it possible for us to transcend 
ourselves. We must learn to deal with this Vital Relation. The enigma to be 
solved lies in this relation, not in technological devices. Human life transcends 
itself when it sees the riddle of the relationship and finds the way out from it. 
The enigma of the relation contains the meaning of human life.
My answer to the question of why, when and how the human can be 
transcended is therefore the following. The crisis of human relations is 
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what fuels the search for a posthumanism that can remedy this crisis. The 
concomitant crisis of a collective faith and of interpersonal relations that we 
witness in contemporary advanced societies finds an explanation in the fact 
that in both of these relations the substance of relationality is diminished, 
that is, the qualities and causal properties of the reciprocity between the 
two terms of the relation are lacking. The loss of the inherent sense of the 
relation is the ‘intervening factor’ which explains both of the crises. If the 
sense of the human relation diminishes, then so does the transcendental 
relation, and vice versa. The same holds true for the relation between the 
human and infrahuman realms. For a deeper understanding of this point, 
it is necessary to recall that the source of the meaning of the relation lies in 
its transcendental matrix, although the social relation is generated (or is 
not generated) due to autonomous causes.
In summary, to grasp the why, where and how the human can transcend 
itself, it is necessary to ‘see’ the peculiarities of interpersonal relations and 
their enigmas. One could observe that even the relations with robots are 
enigmatic, but these enigmas are games, not the stakes of serious life (the 
Durkheimian “vie serieuse”). Thinking that the human person is distinguished 
from animals, plants and machines because it is able to think in first-person 
(i.e. to think of oneself as oneself) is not enough. Nobody can exclude the 
possibility that, in the future, very smart robots or cyborgs could become 
able to behave in such a way. Calling them ‘persons’ as distinct from ‘human 
persons’ means to go back to the Greek concept of person as a mask, for 
example in the modern version of puppets proposed by Goffman, or, in a more 
sophisticated way, it means to embrace the Luhmannian (neo-functionalist) 
view of the human person as a mere ‘reference point for communication,’ 
which removes the distinction between human and non-human. 
To my mind, what distinguishes the human person is her ‘structural 
relational constitution,’ in the inner as well as exterior life. This dynamic 
constitution is the relational substance that enables the human person to 
transcend herself in the relationship with others and with the world, acting 
reflexively, not only in herself (personal reflexivity), but on social relations 
as such (relational reflexivity), which she assesses as good or evil, taking into 
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account the behaviour of significant others and reference to the situational 
context. The first-person perspective that has supported the traditional 
humanism for centuries should be included and upgraded within a new 
relational paradigm, otherwise the humanism that it seems to defend will be 
just the latest attempt to keep alive the old Western individualism vis-à-vis 
the arrival of ‘enhanced humans,’ androids, robots and cyborgs.
The technologies that lead humanity towards the post/trans-human 
must be analyzed and evaluated based on the criteria of which human 
relations they assume, and of those they produce. We have to see if they 
support arrangements that increase the ethical and empathetic sense 
of social relations or, vice versa, nurture relationships that are empty of 
human sense.
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